Almost all the companies in our sector of activity where we have unionisation efforts are either European or a supplier of a European firm. Most of their approaches are not very different from their domestic companies. This is in part due to the structure of our sector of activity. This is because, especially in the automotive sector, Türk-Metal Union is the union that is organised in large workplaces and employers are hesitant to allow other unions to organise at their workplaces out of fear that production will drop. Most of the time, when violations occur as a result of preventing unionisation efforts, framework agreements or company declarations, etc. signed or declared by companies are not functional. Even global unions treat Turkey as a special case and do not want to break their relationship with global companies. There is hardly a single company that does not dispute unions’ competence for collective labour agreements. They usually work with a Turkish lawyer and lawyers tell them that “it is their right to do so.” The only example that I can think of where the company did not object to the Union’s competence is the case of an Austrian company called Voestalpine High Performance Metal A.Ş, where the Union started to organise two years ago in Gebze. Later, a collective agreement was signed with this company. There are even examples such as Schneider Electric, which systematically opposes unionisation efforts at its newly-bought Günsan workplace, even though BMİS is organised in its remaining four workplaces. Considering that the same company is the founder of the Electromechanical Employers’ Union (EMIS), it is rather interesting that it claimed to be in the plastic industry instead of the metal industry. Objections to union competence are used as a bargaining tool. The objection procedure last for take years. The employer expects the union to accept a weaker agreement in exchange of withdrawing its objection to the union’s competence. We also struggle in explaining international organisations that unionisation is prevented through objections to the Union’s competence. For example, during an OECD application a few years ago, following several correspondences, the issue remained unresolved. In our Diam application, even though the French Trade Advisor got involved, there was no solution because the company could not be persuaded. Here, the important issue is that there is no collective bargaining at an industry level in Turkey. As a result, the company where the Union is organised sees itself at a huge disadvantage against other companies that do not have unions and agreements, and the company thinks that it faces a serious cost increase. When its opponents do not have suches issues, it makes the 80 C O L L E C T I V E R I G H T S O F W O R K E R S U N D E R T U R K E Y ’ S C O N T I N U O U S S TAT E O F E M E R G E N C Y T R A D E U N I O N R I G H T S I N E U R O P E A N A N D E U R O P E A N - A F F I L I AT E D E N T E R P R I S E S company aggressive towards unionisation. That is why, for example, they may even consider paying high compensations as a result of dismissals [instead of unionizing]. There would be no serious rights violations after the Union receives the competence certificate and the workplace adopts the new structure set out by collective agreements despite all obstacles, but this is partially because unions are forced to make compromises during unionisation efforts. Most of these companies have European Work Councils.98 We can only participate in these meetings as observers. But in some cases, these Councils contribute to our unionisation efforts. The fact that employment relations in Turkey have very complicated, unique methods also makes our job difficult. Most of the time, we have difficulties explaining this complex system to our foreign interlocutors. Posco produces automotive steel and is an important supplier of Volkswagen, Mercedes, Renault, etc. The Netherlands’ and the Swiss Pension Funds (Nordea Bank) are also among its stakeholders. Therefore, even though it is a South Korean firm, it is an example worth mentioning within the European context. During unionisation attempts at Posco, around 90 workers were dismissed and their severance pay lawsuits are still ongoing. When there are dismissals because of unionisation efforts and prolonged lawsuits because of competence disputes, workers cannot exercise their right to collective bargaining, even if the union receives the competence for collective bargaining in the end because they are no longer working for the workplace (either because they have been dismissed or forced to resign). The State of Emergency did not have a very unique effect on unionisation efforts. We always experience difficulties and restrictions. But, for example, before the State of Emergency (February-March 2016), political interventions into the Renault unionisation process were stemmed from the highest levels and our Union was removed from the workplace. 98 The purpose of a European Works Council (EWC) is to bring together employee representatives from different European countries where multinational companies have operations. During EWC meetings, these representatives are informed and consulted by central management on transnational issues of concern to the company’s employees. Directive 94/45/EC – governing the establishment of such EWCs – is applicable to transnational undertakings and groups of undertakings employing in total more than 1000 employees in the EEA, and at least 150 of them in two member states. INTERVIEW SUMMARIES 81