NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS INSTITUTIONS AS A HUMAN RIGHTS PROTECTION MECHANISM: THE CASES OF THE OMBUDSMAN AND HUMAN RIGHTS AND EQUALITY INSTITUTION OF TURKEY procedures of appointment and dismissal and independence through member composition.59 As can be seen, the issue of independence is mainly considered as administrative and financial independence. In terms of administrative independence, independence must be ensured against other potential interventions from the executive body. Considering that some of the discrimination cases emerge through the acts and actions of public authorities, administrative independence gains more importance.60 Another issue that stands out here is to ensure the independence of these institution from the administration although they are regulated through "administrative" arrangements. Equality institutions can sometimes be formed under the executive body. In such a case, independence must be secured even more. Institutions that are not independent of administration may face reputational loss as they may not be perceived as independent institutions in the eyes of the victims of discrimination. In this case, the equality institution can withstand potential pressure from the executive body and administration only if its independence is secured. This situation is directly related to the emphasis on the existence of a constitutional and legal basis for the aforementioned institution. Ensuring the legal basis of the equality institution preferably through the constitution or laws and abstaining from administrative regulations will strengthen its independence.61 In contrast to the EU Directives, independence must be guaranteed not only at the level of activities, but also at institutional level. In cases where independence is not secured by law, it is difficult to achieve actual independence. Although matters such as the personal efforts of the members of the institution, the specific support of CSOs and trade union and the overall support of the public to the institution actually ensure independence to a certain extent, an additional legal assurance constitutes a guarantee. Article 8(1) of TIHEK Law provides that TIHEK enjoys administrative and financial autonomy and has the status of a public legal person. However, the same paragraph prescribing the association of the Institution with the minister to be assigned by the President shows that the Institution is constituted not under the legislative body, but under the executive body. Currently, this relation is already established with the Ministry of Justice. Article 10(1) of TIHEK Law regulates that the Board will act independently and no body, authority, organ or person will give orders or instructions to the Board or indoctrinate it. However, there is an uncertainty about the sanctions the organ, person, authority or body acting in this way will face. Therefore, it does not seem possible to mention that the members are strongly protected against threats and oppression. A regulation introduced by the DL No. 703 added to Article 8(1) the following new sentence: "The President can exercise its authorities concerning the management of this organization through a minister if s/he deems necessary." This sentence implies that the President has powers also regarding the management of TIHEK. Issues such as the requirement of applying to the Office of the President for those wishing to be selected as Board members, the appointment of all Board members by the President, the possibility of dismissing members upon the approval of the President or the minister to be assigned thereby and subjecting the investigation of the Chairman and members to the permission of the President or the minister to be assigned thereby show that TIHEK is not actually an independent institution. As a matter of fact, this 59 National Human Rights Institutions, p. 10-11, para. 68-85. 60 Gregory, p. 133. 61 Cormack; Niessen, p. 24. 30